Electronic monitoring (EM) has been introduced in over 30 countries around the world. In most English-speaking countries, it has moved well beyond experimental status and become a regularly applied penal measure. Australia has been lagging behind this world trend, as EM has yet not become dominant in our correctional landscape. This is even though sanctions that utilise radio-frequency and/or global positioning systems (GPS) monitoring have existed in Australia for decades. This article critically examines overseas evaluative findings of EM in relation to recidivism, cost-effectiveness and net-widening, as well as some of the issues and concerns that are associated with EM. The article then summarises and explains the limited Australian EM experience to date. It predicts that increased application of EM in Australia seems likely and should be evidence-based. In this context, there is an urgent need for increased understanding about the use and impact of EM in Australia. The article concludes with some observations about the importance of comparative analysis in this context.
Introduction
The pressure of the escalating cost of building and sustaining prisons forced most of the English-speaking countries during the 1970s and 1980s to search for cheap but effective community-based sentences. Following the lead of the United States (US), all of these of the use of EM are made, but there is a dearth of evidence on this issue. This highlights the urgent need for increased research about the use and impact of EM in Australia. It is predicted that increased application of EM in Australia seems likely and it is argued that this should be evidence-based. The article concludes with some observations about the importance of comparative analysis in this context.
International evaluations of EM
This section of the article critically examines the key methodologically sound evaluative studies that have assessed EM sanctions' outcomes related to recidivism, cost effectiveness and net-widening.
Recidivism
EM sanctions are often implemented with the primary objective of reducing recidivism (Brown et al., 2007; Hucklesby, 2009 ). Renzema (2003) conducted a Campbell Collaboration meta-analysis to explore the effects of radio-frequency monitoring on recidivism, based on 14 methodologically rigorous studies that had well-established treatment and control groups. However, no significant reductions in post-sanction recidivism rates were found. Similar findings were reported in a second meta-analysis conducted by Renzema and Mayo-Wilson (2005) . Renzema (2013: 258) recently concluded that the answer to the question ' [d] oes EM affect recidivism after it has concluded?' 'has to be "if at all, probably not much"'. However, he referred to two recent studies that 'have appeared to suggest long-term recidivism reduction'. The first was an evaluation in Sweden, where treatment and social support services are combined with radio-frequency monitoring. This found that the three-year recidivism rate was 26% for offenders subject to radio-frequency monitoring (Marklund and Holmberg, 2009) in combination with treatment and support, compared with 38% for the control stand-alone radio-frequency monitoring program. Another study considered the use of EM in Argentina and found that 22% of former prisoners reoffended, compared with only 13% of offenders subject to EM (Di Tella and Schargrodsky, 2013) . However, it should be noted that this study related to remandees, rather than offenders convicted of an offence. A further Campbell Collaboration project is currently underway.
Contrary to the mixed findings in respect of recidivism following radio-frequency monitoring, studies on GPS monitoring sanctions' effect on recidivism have found considerable impacts. Padgett et al. (2006) found that offenders subject to this form of EM were 95% less likely to commit a new offence than offenders who were not monitored. A follow-up National Institute of Justice study by Bales et al. (2010) in Florida confirmed the earlier findings and indicated that radio-frequency monitoring reduces the likelihood of failure under community supervision by about 30%, while GPS monitoring has a further 6% compliance improvement rate when compared with radio-frequency monitoring (Bales et al., 2010) .
Similarly, the New Jersey State Parole Board (2007) GPS monitoring report suggested that the placement of sex offenders onto GPS monitoring contributed to a much lower recidivism rate compared with statistics from across the US (0.4% vs 5.3%). Gies et al. (2012) assessed 516 sex offenders who were either given parole with GPS monitoring or traditional parole. They found that arrest rates were more than twice as high among offenders on traditional parole compared with those on parole with GPS monitoring. A 2013 evaluation by the same research team in respect of GPS monitoring of high-risk gang offenders found that these offenders were less likely to be rearrested, but were more likely to violate the conditions of their parole and be returned to custody. The program also cost nearly three times as much as the standard form of parole, with Gies et al. (2013: vii) therefore concluding that 'the GPS monitoring program is more expensive, but may be more effective in detecting parole violations'.
It must be noted that a significant component of the success of GPS monitoring sanctions for serious sex offenders in the US has been the mandatory treatment requirement. Treatment strategies have included substance abuse treatment, sex offender treatment, anger management and mental health counselling. Offenders have also typically been assisted with employment-related issues (Brown et al., 2007) . Alongside these rehabilitative initiatives, the wearing of the GPS monitoring device seems to serve as a continuous reminder to offenders that they are on the sanction and their behaviour is being monitored, which seems to deter them from anti-social behaviour and activities that would elicit non-compliance (Mair and Nellis, 2013; Martinovic and Schluter, 2012) . Martinovic suggested that 'one of the key advantages' of this model was that:
. . . offenders quite often [are] not thinking adequately and planning and making split decisions. And this type of sanction actually says, 'You have to pre-plan everything that you will do. There are consequences if you do the wrong thing'. (Australian Broadcasting Corporation Radio, 2011) Accordingly, in combination with treatment, GPS monitoring appears to be habitbreaking, 'allowing ties with anti-social capital to be severed' (Hucklesby, 2013: 242) . Overall, however, Graham and McIvor (2015: 9) have suggested that the effectiveness of EM 'must be understood as contingent and complex'.
Cost-effectiveness
Generally, EM is seen as a cost-effective option, although cost-benefit analyses often do not take into account the costs that would be incurred by any net-widening. According to DeMichele and Payne (2009b) , radio-frequency-based sanctions that provide treatment and employment training are about two-thirds of the cost of incarceration.
Based on US data for 2008, Deloitte recently estimated that moving 50% of low-level offenders from prison to EM would save €15.2 billion (Eggers et al., 2013) . Although not factoring in other benefits (e.g. revenue from taxes), a 2013 analysis by the Scottish Government (2013: 7) found that 'an electronically monitored order is around 9 times cheaper than custody', while more recent information indicates that the cost of EM in Scotland decreased by over 60% between 2011 -2012 (see Graham and McIvor, 2015 .
In 2013, the Washington State Institute for Public Policy finalised an inventory of evidence-and research-based adult correctional programs, finding that EM yielded a net benefit of approximately €21,760 per participant, at a cost of €1,030 per participant (Drake, 2013) . Drake estimated that the odds of a positive net value were 100%. This was more favourable than the Roman et al. (2012) analysis, which found that, on average, EM reduced costs to local and federal agencies by €1,414 per participant, while the average number of arrests prevented per participant could be expected to generate €3,582 in societal benefits per participant. Overall, it was estimated that there was an 80% chance a new EM program would be cost-effective, with an average expected net benefit of €4,336 and median benefit of €4,525 per person.
An earlier analysis suggested that the use of EM in combination with home detention could avert an estimated 781,383 crimes in the US each year and that the 'social value' of the annual reduction in crime would be €453 billion, which would result in a societal benefit of nearly €12 per euro spent (Yeh, 2010) . Finally, a recent Danish study (Andersen and Andersen, 2014) found that, compared with prison, EM decreased social welfare dependence among young offenders at the rate of 4-7%. It was estimated that this could reduce welfare expenditure by nearly €3,300 per person, per year.
The fear surrounding sex offenders has led to the protection of public safety outweighing the overall concerns about the overheads. As discussed above, serious sex offenders are typically placed on GPS monitoring for extended periods, thereby increasing correctional expenditures. However, GPS monitoring sanctions are still generally cheaper than imprisonment, with Brown et al. (2007) reporting that the cost is about one-fifth of the cost of imprisonment in the US.
Net-widening
The research findings on whether radio-frequency monitoring sanctions have resulted in net-widening are mixed. Extensive research in the US and Canada has found instances of net-widening, as low-risk offenders (who would not have been imprisoned) were generally placed on radio-frequency monitoring sanctions (Bales et al., 2010; DeMichele and Payne, 2009b) . Alternative findings, indicating actual prison diversion owing to radiofrequency monitoring sanctions, have been reported in Sweden, New Zealand, England and Wales, as well as Australia. This is because most of these countries released offenders early from prisons, directly onto radio-frequency monitoring sanctions.
The mere existence of GPS monitoring sanctions, which are typically imposed on offenders after serving their sentence, has widened the net of social control. This is because, prior to the existence of extended supervision with GPS monitoring, these offenders would have simply been released into the community after their prison sentence or would have subject to basic probation or parole (DeMichele and Payne, 2009b; New Jersey State Parole Board, 2007) .
According to Nellis et al. (2013) , net-widening can also transpire in terms of increasing penal control and changing the nature and quality of penality. In addition, it can 'thicken the mesh' of community penalties, while thinning the mesh of prison. Furthermore, it can blur the boundaries of penal control into the privacy of the home. The issue of privatization is discussed further below. In the context of EM, Nellis et al. (2013) have observed that its use can signal a shift in penal control from the state to the private sector. It follows, therefore, that although the use of EM in lieu of prison may suggest a more modest form of state intervention and a lesser deprivation of liberty, the use of EM in practice signifies multiple changes to the community corrections net, some of which may serve to ensnare people in ways not originally envisaged or desired. Some further issues with EM are explored below.
Issues and concerns associated with EM
This section of the article critically explores some of the issues and concerns associated with EM.
Technological issues and resource implications
There have been significant improvements in the functioning of the radio-frequency monitoring equipment since the 1980s and there are no longer issues reported with its operation (Black and Smith, 2003; Henderson, 2006) . On the other hand, there are issues with the operation of GPS monitoring, including its inability to maintain a continuous signal when there is no clear path between GPS satellites and tracking units (DeMichele and Payne, 2009a; Nellis, 2010) . There may also be issues with accuracy when it is near water or static for a long period (Scottish Government, 2013) .
In addition, one of the most commonly reported problems associated with the technological operation of GPS monitoring is 'false alerts', which occur frequently as a result of the technological limitations set out above. Monitoring personnel may find it difficult to ascertain which alerts are false and which ones are real and must be attended to (Bales et al., 2010) . In order to manage the enormous data flow and adequately respond to alerts, an effective centralised monitoring centre is vital (Hucklesby, 2009; Sex Offender Supervision and GPS Monitoring Task Force, 2010) . Clearly, there are significant resource implications for the fluid operation of the centralised monitoring centre.
However, it is worth noting that 'EM technology is constantly advancing, becoming less intrusive and cheaper overall' (Martinovic, 2013: xii) . Some recent innovations include 'dead reckoning' when a GPS signal is lost, which enables the offender's movements to be estimated, taking into account their direction, altitude and acceleration. This method can achieve an accuracy of 90% and is particularly useful in determining whether an offender has remained inside a building (Martinovic, 2013: 36) . It is also anticipated that, over the next decade, the use of a Global Navigation Satellite System will expand to combine tracking information from over 100 satellites from various countries (Martinovic, 2013) .
Nevertheless, it must be clearly understood that GPS monitoring technology does not have intrinsic supervisory powers. It provides an indication of a person's location but reveals nothing about what they are doing (DeMichele, 2014) . Infamously, a sex offender in the US kidnapped a girl and kept her hostage for 18 years, including fathering two children with her, while wearing a GPS monitoring device for a period of that time. As Lilly noted when commenting on the case:
. . . he used the girl as a sex slave. He was being monitored electronically, and it recorded that he was at his home. It was recorded that he was in his backyard, but the agents who were checking on his behaviour never went into the backyard to find out what was going on. (Australian Broadcasting Corporation Radio, 2011) In his report on the case, the California Inspector General declared that '[t]he GPS monitoring system created a false sense of security' (Australian Broadcasting Corporation Radio, 2011). On the other hand, DeMichele (2014) has argued that this horrific crime was not the 'fault of the technology', but due to the inadequate resourcing and operational procedures of parole staff who failed to conduct in-depth searches of the offender's home or even walk through his backyard. To reduce the propensity for horrific crimes occurring while offenders are subject to GPS monitoring sanctions, these sanctions must be appropriately funded and not used for offenders who pose a great risk to the community. Nellis (2013) has observed that there has in fact been very little attempt to examine the ethics of EM from the perspective of either punishment or surveillance, including whether exclusion from public space can be justified, either in terms of punishment or crime prevention. Nellis (2013) has also suggested that other ethical concerns relate to the stigmatising effect of wearing an EM device and lifetime monitoring of offenders' mobility. Bülow (2014) recently identified six ethical challenges in respect of the use of EM: public risks and risks to the offender; the challenges of a profit-driven industry; loss of privacy; the risk of stigmatisation; whether EM is a cause for unfairness; and reconciling EM with the aim(s) of punishment. As he noted, '[h]ow we decide on ethical questions does have implications for the technological development of EM' (Bülow, 2014: 516) .
Ethical and privatisation concerns
A more specific concern about the use of EM relates to the private enterprise aspect of the companies that manufacture EM devices. Lilly has observed that a recent bidding competition between two of the leading providers was resolved on the issue of cost, and . . . the way that the cost was reduced . . . was by actually cutting the salaries of the people by one half, who were doing the supervision, and increasing their caseloads by 100 per cent. So, the competition is fierce, and what appears to be happening is that the quality of supervision is going down because of cost reasons. (Australian Broadcasting Corporation Radio, 2011; see also Lilly and Nellis, 2013) This issue was echoed by Paterson (2014: 222) , who suggested that in this context, 'welfare practices are viewed as "beyond the contract" and as costs that should be minimized'. There are clear lessons to be learnt in this regard. As Nellis explained:
I think if the private sector is paid sufficient money to deliver EM as a stand-alone service, then the private sector will be very happy. But I don't think that reflects the best possible use that you could make of EM. (Australian Broadcasting Corporation Radio, 2011) He suggested that the Swedish EM model operates most effectively, as the private sector involvement in it is very limited (Australian Broadcasting Corporation Radio, 2011; Nellis, 2014) . This view is supported by Wennerberg (2013: 115) , who undertook the evaluation of EM in Sweden, and noted:
Private sector involvement has been limited to provision of the equipment, and technical back-up services. . . . Th[is] decision . . . has, in my view, proved successful. . . . the rehabilitative approach has been kept in focus and EM is seen as part of a rehabilitative strategy.
Hence, the research suggests that governments should retain overall control and supervision of offender management, and carefully manage the private aspect of EM.
This is consistent with current practice in Australia, where the private sector involvement in the operation of EM sanctions is minimal. Through the Australian government tender process, states and territories simply purchase or rent the EM equipment from selected private EM providers. The states and territories assume the responsibility of running all aspects of EM programs, such as installing and maintaining devices, sanctioning infringements, and supervising offenders and referring them on to rehabilitative services.
The Australian penal context
We will now provide an overview of the Australian penal context, before turning to the experience with EM. Most criminal justice matters in Australia are dealt with by the six states (presented in descending order of size, these are NSW, Victoria, Queensland, Western Australia, South Australia and Tasmania) and two territories (Australian Capital Territory and Northern Territory). Each of these jurisdictions has its own laws in respect of crimes (e.g. Crimes Act 1900 (NSW)), sentencing (e.g. Crimes (Sentencing Procedure) Act 1999 (NSW)) and the administration of sentences (e.g. Crimes (Administration of Sentences) Act 1999 (NSW)). Although there are also federal criminal laws (Crimes Act 1914 (Cth) Part IB and Criminal Code 1995 (Cth)), federal offending accounts for only 2% of matters (Australian Bureau of Statistics 2016b; 2016c). It should be noted that there are no dedicated prisons for federal offenders, and so they are housed in the eight state and territory prisons. As a result of the fragmented nature of Australian sentencing and corrections, there is unfortunately little consistency in data collection. For example, the national data on corrections (Australian Bureau of Statistics, 2016a) report on the number of persons on community corrections orders, but do not indicate if they are subject to any form of EM. As a result, it is not entirely clear how many people are subject to EM in Australia at any time or what are the parameters of their monitoring.
Whilst similar in character in most respects, each Australian state and territory has its own criminal justice system and, as such, laws and penalties for offenders differ across state/territory boundaries. Notably, there is significant penal diversity across Australia (Tubex et al., 2015) , which has manifested in varying rates in the use of prison and community-based penalties. At the time of writing, there were nearly 40,000 prisoners in Australia (Australian Bureau of Statistics, 2016a). As discussed further below, the national imprisonment rate is 209 per 100,000 population. However, this ranges from 140 and 143 in the Australian Capital Territory and Tasmania respectively (both amongst the smallest jurisdictions in terms of population, although very different in terms of socio-demographics) to 312 in Western Australia and a staggering rate of 881 per 100,000 in the Northern Territory. Both of these latter jurisdictions also have comparatively high Indigenous populations and generally conservative politics. These jurisdictional differences will be discussed in more detail below.
Similarly to other English-speaking countries, well-publicised criticisms of incarceration in Australia in the 1960s and 1970s led to increasing dissatisfaction with its use as a means of controlling offenders. This was supposed to be overcome by the widespread introduction of community-based sanctions that were seen to be:
• • more effective than imprisonment, as they increase the chance of the successful reintegration into the community; • • a more humane way of punishing offenders, as they remain within their conventional network of support; and • • less costly than imprisonment (Chan and Ericson, 1981; Cohen, 1979) .
Community-based sanctions introduced into the Australian sentencing landscape during the 1980s included probation and parole orders, community service orders, home detention (with or without EM) and suspended sentences. These sanctions were set up to operate as alternatives to imprisonment by diverting offenders from prison without widening the net of social control. However, already at this time, Braithwaite (1988: 57) warned that the practical challenge for these new initiatives would be their utilisation as 'actual' alternatives to incarceration and not as an 'add on' to those who would normally receive conditional release.
Over the years, it has generally become apparent that community-based sanctions have failed to live up to their stated promise of significantly improving the sentencing landscape in Australia. This is predominantly because they have not reduced the reliance on imprisonment. Instead, there has been an unprecedented increase in the size of the prison population, with longer terms of incarceration being imposed. For example, in the September quarter of 2016, the imprisonment rate reached 209 per 100,000; it has increased by 30% over the last decade (Australian Bureau of Statistics, 2006; 2016a) . 1 Significantly, this increase occurred without any concomitant increase in the crime rate. In fact, most crime types have decreased substantially over the corresponding time period, and this is not due to the increased use of prison (Bartels, in press; Weatherburn, 2016) .
Increasing overreliance on prisons in Australia can be explained in part by public attitudes that have favoured harsher punishment of offenders and politicians showing just how tough they are on crime. These legislative responses have included legislative mandatory minimum sentences and/or non-parole periods for specific offences, such as assault (Victoria, Western Australia, Northern Territory); driving offences (Western Australia); drug offences (Queensland, Western Australia, Northern Territory); firearm offences (Queensland, South Australia); sex offences (Queensland, Western Australia, Northern Territory); and homicide (NSW, Victoria, Queensland) (see Bartels and Sarre, in press ). In addition, various governments have in recent years imposed restrictions on the availability of bail (Bartels and Sarre, in press ), parole (Bartels, 2013; Fitzgerald et al., 2016) and suspended sentences (Bartels, 2015) , as well as other measures likely to increase prison populations. This is despite strong arguments (see e.g. Bagaric and Pathinayake, 2015) , that Australia should not be following the failed tough-on-crime policy of the US which has contributed to a financial crisis and the retrospective reduction of some prison terms to address overcrowding issues.
In a similar vein, community-based sanctions are generally considered by criminal justice stakeholders to be 'soft options' in comparison to prison. This has led to netwidening, because these sanctions have not typically been used for prison-bound offenders, but rather for offenders who would otherwise be treated less harshly (Weatherburn, 2016) . A further issue is that, while these sanctions are operationally significantly cheaper than imprisonment, they are expensive in absolute terms if they have high levels of breaches and violations (Menendez and Weatherburn, 2014) . It is, however, important to note that, in comparison with other community-based sanctions, home detention (with or without EM) has repeatedly had the lowest rates of net-widening and breach (New South Wales (NSW) Standing Committee on Law and Justice, 2006; Victorian Sentencing Advisory Council, 2008) . Despite this, stakeholders have generally held negative perceptions of it. The specific reasons behind these ill-informed perceptions are discussed further below.
The Australian experience with EM
This section provides an overview of the Australian experience with EM and an explanation of the trends.
Home detention
Home detention programs, whereby an offender is monitored in the community under strict conditions as an alternative to imprisonment, were introduced sporadically between 1986 and 2004 in all of the mainland states of Australia (Victorian Parliamentary Library Research Service, 2011). As part of these programs, New South Wales (NSW), Victoria, South Australia and the Northern Territory all initially used radio-frequency monitoring but have more recently transferred to using GPS monitoring.
NSW. NSW is the largest jurisdiction in Australia, in terms of both its general and prison populations. According to Tubex et al. (2015: 350) , its 'trends tend to drive national imprisonment numbers and rates'. They characterised the penal policy in NSW has having 'played out through a number of criminal justice system policies or drivers ' (2015: 351) . They distinguished the period from the 1970s to the mid-1980s as having been characterised by decriminalization, (lenient) bail reform and reductions in sentence lengths. The period since then, by contrast, has been marked by a more 'punitive turn ' (2015: 351) , typified by the introduction of 'standard non-parole periods' in 2003 (which some perceive as a form of mandatory sentencing) and more recent restrictions on the availability of parole.
Home detention started in NSW in 1997 and is still operational, although it has had an ongoing problem with the relatively small number of offenders subject to it. As a result, the NSW Standing Committee on Law and Justice (2006) and the NSW Auditor-General (Achterstraat, 2010) explored the reasons behind its lack of use and made a number of recommendations to expand its use. Both reports outlined the following issues with home detention: it is not available state-wide; some judges view it as a soft option, whereas many offenders perceive it to be too onerous; and its screening process had become more rigorous over time.
In 2012, the NSW Law Reform Commission recommended that home detention be abolished and replaced with a community detention order. Whilst it does not seem that any of these recommendations have been enacted to date, NSW Community Corrections promoted the availability and use of home detention amongst the judiciary in 2014-2015. Perhaps as a result, home detention numbers have since been increasing and have reached over 200 offenders (NSW Government, 2016) . In June 2016, it was reported that the NSW Government would spend €2 million 'trialling GPS monitoring devices that will track high-risk domestic violence offenders so as to alert authorities and potentially victims if they approach restricted areas like homes and schools' (Cowan, 2016: np) .
Victoria. Victoria has traditionally had one of the lowest imprisonment rates in Australia, which Tubex et al. attributed to lower crime rates, the small number of Indigenous people in prison (bearing in mind that Indigenous people are significantly over-represented in prisons across Australia) and low remand rates, 'but predominantly due to a comparatively benign judicial culture in respect of the use of imprisonment ' (2015: 353) . However, this has changed in recent years, especially following the election of a conservative government with a 'tough on crime' agenda (Tubex et al., 2015) and widespread reforms to parole laws after the rape and murder of Jill Meagher by parolee Adrian Bayley in September 2012 (Bartels, 2013) . The Victorian prison population increased by 23% between 2013 and September 2016. Interestingly, this was not at the expense of community-based corrections, which increased by 57% (Australian Bureau of Statistics, 2016a). It should be noted that the national increases during this period were 26% and 23% respectively.
Victoria initiated home detention with radio-frequency monitoring in 2004, but experienced low offender numbers as an ongoing issue (Melbourne Centre for Criminological Research and Evaluation, 2006; Victorian Sentencing Advisory Council, 2008) . In 2011, the newly-elected conservative Victorian Government abolished this program as part of its tough on crime agenda. In 2013, the same government introduced GPS monitoring technology as a possible condition of parole and 'community correction orders' (ie, remove capitals). Whilst offender numbers on these orders have been very small, they have been increasing, reaching 87 offenders as at 30 June 2016 (Adult Parole Board of Victoria, 2016). In December 2016, the media reported that '[t]eenage offenders could be fitted with electronic tags … under a youth law and order crackdown' (Willingham, 2016) . However, it was noted that although '[EM] could be used to monitor some offenders . . . the program is still being developed'.
South Australia. South Australia is the only Australian colony (i.e. the original six states) that was not a penal colony and was 'colloquially known as the "upright" settlement' (Tubex et al., 2015: 357) . As was the case in many other jurisdictions in Australia and beyond, the 1970s and early 1980s were a period of relative leniency. However, the mood then shifted and, according to Tubex et al. (2015: 358), '[s]ince 2002, . . . the Labor government has maintained a "tough on crime" stance almost as a badge of honour'. Specific areas of target for this punitive mood have included tougher penalties in respect of sex and drug offences, as well as restrictions in relation to suspended sentences and parole (Bartels, 2013 (Bartels, , 2015 Tubex et al., 2015) . South Australia also has a high proportion of remanded prisoners, who accounted for 40% of all prisoners in the September 2016 quarter, compared with a national rate of 31% (Australian Bureau of Statistics, 2016a).
Home detention is available in South Australia as both a back-end (post-release) and front-end alternative to prison, and EM is available as a condition of intensive bail (South Australian Department for Correctional Services, 2014; Victorian Parliamentary Library Research Service, 2011) . Legislative amendments in 2013 further extended the use of 'EM for prisoners, offenders and other persons released from custody that are assessed as potentially posing a risk to the community' (South Australian Department for Correctional Services, 2014: 86) . In 2014, the Correctional Services Minister indicated that the Government was attempting to reduce prison numbers 'by placing more people in home custody with monitoring bracelets on their ankles' (Australian Broadcasting Corporation, 2015) . As at 30 September 2016, there were 846 offenders subject to EM in South Australia; although the vast majority of these were on intensive bail (Australian Bureau of Statistics, 2016a), this suggests that South Australia uses EM to a much greater extent than the other Australian jurisdictions.
Northern Territory. The Northern Territory is unusual in several respects. It has the smallest population of any Australian jurisdiction (around 245,000, or 1% of the total Australian population). It also has a much higher Indigenous population (approximately 30% of the total population, compared with 3% nationally). In the present context, however, the most notable feature is its imprisonment rate -881 per 100,000 -which is by far the highest in Australia, and higher than the national US rate. In July 2016, revelations on television about the treatment of young people in custody made international headlines and prompted a Royal Commission. This event may have caused the then Government to lose power at the election shortly thereafter in September 2016 (see Bartels, 2016 , for discussion).
The Northern Territory currently has a modest home detention program, with about 20 offenders typically on this sanction at any one time (Australian Bureau of Statistics, 2016a). In May 2016, the Government allocated nearly €3 million for 'bracelets . . . for GPS tracking, . . . monitoring those in home detention, and . . . track [ing] offenders' blood alcohol levels' (Vanovac, 2016) . As stated above, however, the then Government lost power in September and it is not yet clear whether the new Labor Government will continue to pursue this initiative.
Combining surveillance with treatment on home detention. Australian legislators introduced home detention programs mostly based on a strict and close surveillance and monitoring regime, but also containing rehabilitative treatment components as a part of casemanagement. Surveillance and monitoring measures have typically encompassed EM, a few face-to-face visits per week, random 'drive-by' contacts and phone calls, as well as urinalysis and breath testing (Melbourne Centre for Criminological Research and Evaluation for Corrections Victoria, 2006; Smith and Gibbs, 2013) .
In all Australian jurisdictions, treatment and rehabilitative initiatives have been plentiful and offenders' participation has been dependent on their specific issues, their criminogenic needs and other goals. Initiatives have been determined on the basis of individualised case-management, which is able to respond to offenders' changing circumstances and is said to increase the chance of breaking the cycle of offending (Melbourne Centre for Criminological Research and Evaluation for Corrections Victoria, 2006; NSW Standing Committee on Law and Justice, 2006) .
It should also be noted that offender supervision supporting offender treatment and rehabilitation has been particularly employed in Australian back-end home detention programs (South Australia and Victoria). This is through the application of a case-management principle that specifically encourages both offenders and their co-residents to engage in pro-social activities and lifestyles (Heath, 1996 ; Melbourne Centre for Criminological Research and Evaluation for Corrections Victoria, 2006). Furthermore, while supervising officers are typically liaising with offenders' families, they are also in dialogue with offender support agencies, with the objective of successfully reintegrating offenders back into the wider community (Heath, 1996 ; Melbourne Centre for Criminological Research and Evaluation for Corrections Victoria, 2006) .
A comprehensive benchmarking study of home detention programs in Australia by Henderson (2006) confirmed that supervising officers regard a mix of surveillance monitoring mechanisms and rehabilitative provisions imposed through case-management practices as critical components of effective home detention programs. In particular, Henderson outlined the importance of:
• • an intensive case-management approach combining monitoring/supervision with guidance/counselling; • • an effective case-management approach based on one-to-one personal contact; and • • ensuring 'a constructive day' through work or other activities.
As offenders on home detention programs are typically individually case-managed according to their specific risks and needs, their reintegrative prospects are enhanced.
Analysis of Australian trends in the use of home detention
Despite engaging offenders in supportive and rehabilitative processes in line with best practice research, the home detention programs that have continued operating in Australia have generally struggled with relatively small offender numbers. This is because stakeholders have generally held uncertain and unfavourable views about them. This seems to be due to two reasons.
First, no Australian jurisdiction has engaged with and informed the relevant stakeholders in the development and evolving operation of home detention programs. Stakeholders are defined as those organisations or persons concerned with EM operations, that is, supervisory agencies, law enforcement, lawyers, judicial officers, parole boards, educational and social service agencies, legislatures, victims, victims, the public, and the media (Brown et al., 2007; DeMichele and Payne, 2009b) . Electronic supervision administrators must obtain continuous stakeholder support. This is because the successful implementation of the EM program relies heavily on the cooperation of agency partnerships, particularly between law enforcement, supervision agencies and wider social institutions, as well as public acceptance of and confidence in such initiatives (DeMichele and Payne, 2009b) .
Further, there has been no official education strategy established to inform the wider stakeholder community about home detention. Consequently, neither the positive outcomes nor the punitive effects of these programs have been effectively publicised. For example, such information would include the fact that home detention has much better reintegrative and rehabilitative prospects in comparison with prison, and that offenders exposed to it mostly view it as onerous, and even punitive (NSW Standing Committee on Law and Justice, 2006; Victorian Sentencing Advisory Council, 2008) . This lack of collaborative stakeholder involvement is surprising, as it is well documented that when community-based correctional programs are politically supported, they are well-resourced and hence more likely to operate effectively (Martinovic, 2014) .
It should be noted that during the 1980s, when home detention programs were being set up in Australia, there was a recommendation to develop 'a careful and low-key information campaign to inform the media (and through them, the public) of the nature of the majority of people presently confined in our prisons' (Dick et al., 1986: 12) . As far as can be determined, it does not seem that this ever took place. Hence, the ill-informed public's lack of support for home detention programs and criminal justice policies more generally should not be surprising.
Second, the media has predominantly reported negative stories about home detention programs throughout Australia. In particular, it raised the profile of these sanctions by misleadingly portraying them as 'elitist,' that is, mostly used by white-collar criminals and upper-class offenders. In addition, the media has extensively reported instances when offenders on these sanctions have taken off monitoring devices and/or engaged in serious re-offending (Martinovic, 2013 ; there have been mixed findings in the international context: see Graham and McIvor, 2015) . This is despite the fact that, in reality, instances of placing affluent offenders on such orders and serious re-offending are isolated. This has resulted in community opposition to these sanctions and inevitably a push toward incarceration as a preferred sentencing disposition.
GPS monitoring of sex offenders
Over the last decade, extended supervision orders with GPS monitoring have been implemented in NSW, Victoria, Queensland and Western Australia to monitor sex offenders. The introduction of GPS monitoring in Australia was sparked by the community uproar following the release of high-profile violent sex offenders back into the community, especially Dennis Ferguson in Queensland in 2003 (Edgely, 2007) . The Queensland Government reacted six months later by passing the Dangerous Prisoners (Sexual Offenders) Act 2003 (Qld) , the first Australian legislation that allowed for post-sentence preventative detention, as well as continued community-based supervision under extended supervision orders (Edgely, 2007) . Western Australia, Victoria and NSW then followed suit with similar legislation.
Victoria was the first jurisdiction to use EM as a core condition of extended supervision orders to enforce offenders' night curfew, as well as preventing them from leaving home during the times when they are likely to encounter children (Smith and Gibbs, 2013) . Again, other jurisdictions replicated this model, with NSW and Queensland passing legislation to supervise dangerous sex offenders with EM in 2006 and Western Australia doing so in 2012 (Sandy, 2011) .
Offenders on GPS monitoring in Australia are limited in where they can live and work and their contact with children is restricted (Smith and Gibbs, 2013) . They can be subjected to GPS monitoring for periods of up to 15 years but are reviewed every few years (Provan, 2007; Smith and Gibbs, 2013) . All of these offenders are required to undertake rehabilitative initiatives in accordance with their individual risk/needs (Edgely, 2007; Smith and Gibbs, 2013) . Rehabilitative initiatives include substance abuse, sex offender and anger management treatment, as well as mental health counselling. Under all of the legislative schemes, if an offender fails to comply with any of the predetermined conditions of their sanction, without a reasonable excuse, breach action is initiated and if proven, offenders can be sentenced to a term of five years' imprisonment (Provan, 2007) .
The Victorian Government has established a 55-bed supervised and supported accommodation facility, the only one in the country, for serious sex offenders on GPS monitored sanctions who have not been able to secure suitable accommodation elsewhere in the community (as they are precluded from living near schools, kindergartens and child-care centres) (Smith and Gibbs, 2013; Wilkinson and Dowsley, 2007) . Within this transitional facility, called Corella Place, all offenders are required to attend mandatory counselling sessions and take part in rehabilitation programs (Palin, 2016) . In addition, they are subjected to both radio-frequency and GPS monitoring because there have been issues with the transfer to and operation of the GPS monitoring. Controversially, there have been a few instances where offenders have escaped detention, and removed their EM device. The media reported these escapes in a sensational manner, despite the fact that the authorities were automatically alerted when this occurred and offenders were re-captured within days (Bucci and Oakes, 2013; Vonow and Chamberlin, 2013) . The existence of the Corella Place Transitional Facility has been vigorously criticised by prominent scholars as being an example of 'quasi detention' that lacks facilities, but victims of crime groups generally support its operation (Wilkinson and Dowsley, 2007) .
The legislative changes allowing GPS monitoring sanctions to be used in supervising dangerous sex offenders after the expiration of their original sentence have been part of populist law and order policies that exemplify being 'tough on crime'. These policies were implemented quickly and they attracted little controversy, owing to the seriousness of the offending behaviour and a general consensus that GPS monitoring sanctions would enhance public safety.
It should be noted that the actual numbers of dangerous sex offenders on GPS monitoring sanctions in Australia are not publicly available. This is because in some jurisdictions they are counted as a part of the imprisoned offender cohort, and in others as part of the paroled offender cohort. Therefore, a uniform national classification of these offenders is urgently needed (Martinovic, 2016) .
Evidence of the effectiveness of EM in Australia
There have been no evaluations of GPS monitoring sanctions, and limited research has been conducted about the operation of radio-frequency monitoring sanctions in the Australian context. Notwithstanding this, evaluation studies have repeatedly shown recidivism rates of around 10% during radio-frequency monitoring programs, much lower than the rate of 50% for offenders released from prison and 26% for offenders on other community-based dispositions ( Radio-frequency monitoring sanctions have been reported to more effectively support reintegration and rehabilitation of offenders than other sentencing dispositions (NSW Standing Committee on Law and Justice, 2006; Victorian Sentencing Advisory Council, 2008) . Hence, the more intensive targeting of rehabilitation programs to offenders as part of their individual case-management and supervision seems to better prepare them to adopt a pro-social lifestyle. This practice is in line with the international best practice indicating that sanctions that encompass rehabilitative provisions based on individual case-planning which address offenders specific risks/needs are associated with reduced recidivism rates (Henderson, 2006) .
The cost of radio-frequency monitoring has been estimated to be about a quarter to a half of the cost of incarceration (then estimated at about €70,000 per year). Radio-frequency monitoring in NSW (Achterstraat, 2010 ; Melbourne Centre for Criminological Research and Evaluation for Corrections Victoria, 2006; NSW Standing Committee on Law and Justice, 2006) was estimated to cost around €14,000 per offender per year, whereas the cost in Victoria was €34,000. The reported figures represented the average cost per offender per year, which encompasses all operational costs of the program including staffing and offender supervision with radio-frequency monitoring and the rehabilitative provisions. It should be noted that these costs are not inclusive of the costs associated with processing radio-frequency monitoring's technical violators and recidivists (although the former at least are probably minor). Unfortunately, more recent data are not readily available.
Given that radio-frequency monitoring is no longer in use in Australia, and that there is a lack of information about the use, impact and cost of GPS monitoring sanctions, it is imperative that rigorous and independent evaluation of GPS monitoring sanctions is conducted as a matter of some urgency (see Martinovic, 2016) .
The future application of EM in Australia
In line with the current increase in application of EM internationally, we predict that there will be further utilisation of EM in Australia. This is primarily because, as explained above, evaluative findings that are associated specifically with GPS-EM sanctions in the US have generally shown effective outcomes, as well as practical strategies on how to achieve them. Also, a reputable body of research is emerging on possible ways to overcome the issues and concerns that are associated with GPS-EM sanctions.
In addition, when compared with prisons, EM sanctions have many benefits. Foremost, these sanctions have fewer 'social costs' than prisons as offenders are better able to retain valuable family and community ties by remaining at home. They are also kept out of 'crime schools', which is particularly significant for younger offenders (Clear and Dammer, 2003: 221-223) . Further, when EM sanctions offer extensive treatment intervention strategies and other services such as employment programs, they have the potential to lower recidivism; this is because the forced discipline, structure and schedule advances long-term behavioural change (Alarid et al., 2008: 191) . It is also worth noting that EM sanctions have broader economic advantages. Significantly, if an offender is employed and can continue to pay taxes, there is a reduced possibility of government assistance funds being needed for them or their family (DeMichele and Payne, 2009b: 231) .
Finally, increased application of EM sanctions seems likely, given that the application of surveillance technology has rapidly expanded over the last decade, with the 21st century already having been defined as the 'age of surveillance' (Lyon, 2006: 3; Welsh and Farrington, 2009: 122) . In particular, the surveillance and monitoring of the movement of individuals at least in developed societies has grown to become a routine feature of every-day life. The technology that has permitted this has most significantly been closed circuit television cameras and, more recently, before drones. Whilst there may be legitimate reasons to be concerned about potential large-scale indiscriminate and persistent surveillance as a result of these technological advances, these concerns are less relevant in relation to EM sanctions. This is because EM sanctions are primarily designed to impose surveillance on convicted offenders (and those on bail to a much lesser extent) in lieu of custodial confinement. We believe the use of EM is justified only where it functions as a substitute for prison, rather than being used as a form of net-widening.
Conclusion
It has been documented, albeit on the basis of limited research, that a significant component of radio-frequency monitoring sanctions' effectiveness in Australia has been the treatment provisions for offenders. Hence, EM technology should not be viewed as a deterrent tool in itself (DeMichele, 2014; Nellis, 2010) . Instead, as Nellis (2010) suggests, this form of technology should be utilised as a surveillance strategy in the context of a sanction and combined with treatment and rehabilitative methods.
Given that increased application of EM in Australia seems likely, there is a need to ensure the use of EM generally conforms with the evidence base on good practice. For instance, Martinovic (2013: 280-290) has highlighted the need to:
• • work collaboratively and share information with stakeholders;
• • include rehabilitative and reintegrative strategies in the use of EM; and • • conduct ongoing independent evaluation that informs continual improvement. Implementation of these strategies would go a significant way towards addressing the above-mentioned current issues that EM sanctions face regarding ill-informed public perceptions and overly negative media portrayal.
We argue that, EM will only be effective if it is coupled with evidence-based measures, particularly those which seek to address offenders' criminogenic needs and (re) engage them with more pro-social forms of behaviour (Graham and McIvor, 2015; Martinovic, 2013: 283-285) .
Given the pressures of increasing prisoner numbers and advances in EM technology, the international experience discussed in the first part of the article is instructive for Australia, as many of the issues identified, such as ethical considerations and the risks of net-widening, are of universal relevance. The situation in Australia, including the relative lack of use of EM and the paucity of information about its use and effectiveness, is also instructive for an international audience to compare and contrast with its own experience.
Funding
The author(s) disclosed receipt of the following financial support for the research, authorship, and/or publication of this article: The research in this paper is based in part on a consultancy project undertaken by Bartels for the Australian Capital Territory (ACT) Government but the views expressed do not represent the views of the ACT Government or anyone associated with it.
Note
1. By way of international context, this rate is low compared with the US -which imprisons more than 700 people per 100,000 -but it is three times higher than in the Scandinavian countries (Walmsley, 2016 ; for discussion, see Bartels, in press).
